Dispositional free riders do not free ride on punishment by Weber, Till O. et al.
ARTICLE
Dispositional free riders do not free ride on
punishment
Till O. Weber 1,2,3, Ori Weisel4 & Simon Gächter 3,5,6
Strong reciprocity explains prosocial cooperation by the presence of individuals who incur
costs to help those who helped them (‘strong positive reciprocity’) and to punish those who
wronged them (‘strong negative reciprocity’). Theories of social preferences predict that in
contrast to ‘strong reciprocators’, self-regarding people cooperate and punish only if there are
sufﬁcient future beneﬁts. Here, we test this prediction in a two-stage design. First, partici-
pants are classiﬁed according to their disposition towards strong positive reciprocity as either
dispositional conditional cooperators (DCC) or dispositional free riders (DFR). Participants
then play a one-shot public goods game, either with or without punishment. As expected,
DFR cooperate only when punishment is possible, whereas DCC cooperate without pun-
ishment. Surprisingly, dispositions towards strong positive reciprocity are unrelated to strong
negative reciprocity: punishment by DCC and DFR is practically identical. The ‘burden of
cooperation’ is thus carried by a larger set of individuals than previously assumed.
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The neoclassical Homo economicus model of humans asrational beings in narrow pursuit of their own self-interestdoes not sit well with the varied range of uniquely human
phenomena that depend on self-sacriﬁcial cooperative behaviour.
Risk taking in large-scale conﬂict, caring for the sick and disabled,
and periodic collective efforts, such as democratic movements
combating authoritarian regimes or workers engaging in collec-
tive action, illustrate how humans stand out among other
(cooperative) species by cooperating in large groups that extend
genealogical kinship even when cooperation entails the forgoing
of private welfare in the interest of the greater good1–3. Not
everyone is a cooperator, though: some people are predisposed to
cooperate, even at a cost, as long as they expect their group
members to cooperate as well. Others never cooperate, irrespec-
tive of what they expect other group members to do. In the
economics literature, these two types are commonly referred to as
‘conditional cooperators’ and ‘free riders’, respectively4. Coop-
eration in a population consisting of conditional cooperators and
free riders is likely to deteriorate over time, because conditional
cooperators’ willingness to cooperate would vanish in light of free
riders’ reluctance to do so5.
A central result in the literature is that cooperation can be
sustained through ‘strong reciprocity’, which entails that even in
the absence of material incentives, e.g. in one-shot interactions
with strangers, there is not only a willingness to pay a cost for
cooperating with cooperative others (‘strong positive reciprocity’),
but also for punishing non-cooperative others (‘strong negative
reciprocity’)6–13. Thus, strong reciprocity is distinct from weak
reciprocity, which refers to settings where cooperation and pun-
ishment can be rationalised by selﬁsh, strategic incentives1.
In this paper, we test the hypothesis that strong positive and
strong negative reciprocity are correlated at the individual level.
Such a correlation implies that conditional cooperators are more
likely than free riders to contribute to public goods in one-shot
settings without punishment; and to punish non-contributors in
one-shot settings with punishment14,15. The intuition for
assuming this correlation is that costly punishment of non-
cooperators can reasonably be viewed a form of second-order
cooperation in itself16–19. Therefore, it is plausible to expect that
individuals who refuse to engage in self-sacriﬁcing ﬁrst-order
cooperation (‘free riders’) would be unwilling to spend resources
for engaging in second-order cooperation in the form of pun-
ishment, and would rather free ride on the punishment of others.
More formally, social preference models in economics imply a
correlation between strong positive and negative reciprocity by
formalising reciprocity as unidimensional, using a single game-
independent individual-level parameter to simultaneously capture
preferences for both positive and negative reciprocity20–22. In
these models, only people for whom this parameter is positive
consider cooperating in a one-shot public goods game without
punishment, or punishing when this opportunity exists; if the
parameter equals zero, people care only about their own mone-
tary payoff and never cooperate nor punish without strategic
incentives for doing so. Similarly, models of inequality aver-
sion23,24 assume a game-independent (lack of) aversion to
inequality. Just like agents with no inclination towards recipro-
city, agents who are not inequality averse, but are only motivated
by material self-interest, will never cooperate (unless there is a
threat of being punished) nor punish. Thus, from the viewpoint
of prominent theories of social preferences, only people who are
sufﬁciently motivated by inequality aversion or reciprocity will
cooperate in the absence of punishment (strong positive reci-
procity), and punish non-contributors in the presence of pun-
ishment (strong negative reciprocity).
The assumption of correlated strong positive and negative
reciprocity is also present in theoretical and simulation-based
work on cooperation in evolutionary biology. In these models, the
population consists of (a) self-regarding agents who neither
cooperate with cooperative others nor punish non-cooperative
others, (b) conditional cooperators who are willing to cooperate,
but do not punish, and (c) strong reciprocators who both coop-
erate and punish. The fourth logically possible type—punishers
who do not cooperate—is explicitly omitted (some models also
omit cooperators)7,25,26.
Lastly, the hypothesis that strong positive and negative reci-
procity are correlated is in line with a common pattern in the
experimental literature on cooperation and punishment, whereby
agents who cooperate are also those who tend to punish free
riders14,27–32. This pattern, however, may be misleading, due to
the typical setup of most of these experiments. With some
exceptions33–35, dispositions towards cooperation (i.e. whether
individuals are strong positive reciprocators or not) are not
measured independently, but are inferred from behaviour in
settings where players’ moves are simultaneous, their payoffs are
interdependent, and there is a threat of being punished. While the
ﬁnding that cooperators constitute the majority of punishers in
such settings does not contradict the hypothesis that strong
positive and negative reciprocity are correlated, it is also not
convincing support of it, and certainly not proof, because coop-
eration is not inﬂuenced only by dispositions towards coopera-
tion, but also by beliefs about the cooperation and punishment of
others. To illustrate, consider an individual who is in principle
willing to positively reciprocate others’ cooperation, but happens
to be pessimistic about their actual cooperation. This person may
refrain from cooperation, despite her positive reciprocal ten-
dency, behaving as a free rider who will not cooperate even if
others do. Similarly, cooperation when there is a threat of pun-
ishment is not necessarily an indication of a disposition to
cooperate, but might be a result of the changed incentives (i.e.
fear of being punished).
Is the correlation between strong positive and negative reci-
procity necessary, in principle, to explain cooperation? The
answer seems to be ‘no’, according to models showing that
punishment can sustain cooperation without requiring condi-
tional cooperation at all36, and, more generally, that dispositions
towards seemingly irrational behaviours—in our case, either
costly cooperation or costly punishment—can emerge, indepen-
dently of each other, as an effective way to solve commitment
problems37. Given the basic maxim of strong reciprocity—that, in
addition to strong positive reciprocity, strong negative reciprocity
is also required to explain cooperation—the reliance on strong
reciprocators to both cooperate with cooperative others and to
punish uncooperative others, or even the existence of such a
group of individuals, is not a logical necessity. As long as pun-
ishment provides sufﬁcient incentives to steer free riders towards
cooperation, the identity of the punishers is inconsequential; it
should not matter if the punishers are predisposed towards
cooperating with cooperative others (dispositional conditional
cooperators (DCC)) or not (dispositional free riders (DFR)).
As explained above, existing evidence in seeming support of
the hypothesis of a positive correlation of strong positive and
negative reciprocity—and also against it38–42—does not, with
exceptions33–35, control for beliefs and expectations about
others’ behaviour when determining dispositions towards coop-
eration. The current work makes a distinction between agents’
intrinsic disposition towards (ﬁrst-order) cooperation and their
actual cooperative behaviour in the presence of punishment, by
employing a two-phase experimental design. In the ﬁrst phase, we
classify participants according to their disposition towards strong
positive reciprocity as either ‘Dispositional Conditional Coop-
erators’ (strong positive reciprocators; DCC) or ‘Dispositional
Free Riders’ (not willing to positively reciprocate others’
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cooperation; DFR). In the second phase, we examine their
cooperation and punishment behaviour (which, to be clear, can
differ from their disposition) in a one-shot public goods game
either with or without punishment (study 1), or with different
levels of punishment effectiveness (study 2). Importantly, in both
studies, the classiﬁcation procedure in the ﬁrst phase controls for
beliefs about the behaviour of others and is thus a clean measure
of dispositions towards strong positive reciprocity. The second
phase, a one-shot interaction in which there is no material
incentive to use punishment, is a clean measure of dispositions
towards strong negative reciprocity (see Methods).
The main predictions that arise from our reading of the lit-
erature are that (a) only DCC contribute to the public good in the
absence of punishment; (b) to avoid punishment, DFR, as well as
DCC, contribute to the public good when punishment is avail-
able15; and (c) only DCC will spend resources to punish non-
cooperators. Strong negative reciprocity acts (punishment) are
predicted to be exerted only by DCC, who by deﬁnition are strong
positive reciprocators.
We also investigate the role of emotions in the decision making
of DCC and DFR. Negative emotions—particularly anger—have
been shown to be a proximate mechanism behind strong negative
reciprocity14,43–45. The punishment of non-cooperators serves as
an outlet for negative emotions, and the psychological reward
associated with punishment can outweigh the material cost46. We
utilise the link between negative emotions and costly punishment
to explore potential individual differences in the proximate
explanation of punishment. If DFR never punish, the question
arises: do DFR experience less anger than DCC in the face of
others’ defection, or do DFR experience similar levels of anger,
but still refrain from punishing? To address these questions, and,
if DFR do engage in punishment, to understand whether they do
so for similar reasons to DCC, we elicit the intensity of a range of
emotions experienced by participants.
Our results support the ﬁrst two hypotheses, but refute the
third. DCC are indeed much more willing than DFR to cooperate
in the absence of punishment. When there is a threat of pun-
ishment, DFR increase their contributions to nearly DCC-like
levels. Surprisingly and in contrast to the third hypothesis, DCC
and DFR are highly similar in the way they use punishment, with
comparable levels of punishment, motives for punishment, and
emotional response to non-cooperators. In other words, DFR—as
compared to DCC—do not free ride on others’ costly punishment
of non-cooperators.
Results
Dispositions towards strong positive reciprocity (study 1).
Following the ﬁrst phase, 48.9% of the players were classiﬁed as
DCC, whose contribution schedule is increasing in the con-
tributions of their group members, and 26.6% of the players as
DFR, who are not willing to contribute anything regardless of the
contribution of the other group members. The remaining 24.5%
are unclassiﬁed and excluded from analysis (see Methods and
Supplementary Notes 1, 2 for the classiﬁcation criteria and
additional details).
Beliefs and contribution behaviour (study 1). Without pun-
ishment both DCC and DFR behave in a way that is true to their
disposition towards cooperation (Fig. 1a). A full 78% of DFR are
perfectly consistent with their elicited disposition and contribute
nothing, whereas 76% of DCC make a positive contribution
(MDFR= 1.85, MDCC= 7.39, Mann–Whitney z= 4.23, P < 0.001).
Both DCC and DFR contribute less than what they believe others
to contribute, but the difference is signiﬁcant only for DFR (DCC:
Mcontribution= 7.39, Mbelief= 8.24, Wilcoxon signed-rank test z=
−1.08, P= 0.282; DFR: Mcontribution= 1.85, Mbelief= 3.30, z=
−2.22, P= 0.027). Interestingly, beliefs of DFR are signiﬁcantly
lower than beliefs of DCC (MDFR= 3.30, MDCC= 8.24,
Mann–Whitney z= 3.93, P < 0.001).
The presence of punishment opportunities (Fig. 1b) has little
effect on DCC, with neither beliefs nor contributions sig-
niﬁcantly differing as compared to without punishment
(Mann–Whitney zbelief=−0.83, Pbelief= 0.409; zcontribution=
−1.34, Pcontribution= 0.180). Beliefs and behaviour of DFR,
however, are dramatically affected by punishment
12
Contributions and beliefs Punishment
*** *
***
**
n.s.
n.s.
n.s. n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
10
8
M
on
ey
 u
ni
ts
 (M
U)
6
4
2
0
12 2.5 100
80
60
Pe
rc
en
t
40
20
0
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
10
8
M
on
ey
 u
ni
ts
 (M
U)
6
4
2
0
Decision
Belief
Dispositional conditional cooperators (DCC)
Dispositional free riders (DFR)
M
on
ey
 u
ni
ts
 (M
U)
Without punishment With punishment Proportion of punishersExpenditure
a b c d
Fig. 1 Contribution and prosocial punishment behaviour of DCC and DFR. a Contributions and beliefs in the without punishment treatment (NDCC= 41;
NDFR= 27). Asterisks refer to Mann–Whitney/Wilcoxon signed-rank tests; n.s. P≥ 0.10; **P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01. b Contributions and beliefs in the with
punishment treatment (NDCC= 49; NDFR= 22). Asterisks refer to Mann–Whitney/Wilcoxon signed-rank tests; n.s. P≥ 0.10; *P < 0.10; ***P < 0.01. c
Average expenditure on prosocial punishment. n.s. P > 0.10; Mann–Whitney test. d Proportion of punishers engaged in prosocial punishment. n.s.
P > 0.10; χ2 test. The error bars indicate ± 1 SEM
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(Mann–Whitney zbelief=−2.00, Pbelief= 0.046; zcontribution=
−2.00, Pcontribution= 0.045), increasing to DCC-like levels. Note
that this shift in beliefs and contributions does not necessarily
reﬂect a change in DFR’s disposition towards cooperation; rather,
it is likely to reﬂect the expectation that the opportunity to punish
will raise overall contributions, and a desire to avoid being
punished by contributing (almost) as much as the others.
Overall, the results with respect to beliefs and contributions are
consistent with strong positive reciprocity. Without punishment,
DCC positively reciprocate what they expect others to contribute,
conditioning their own contribution on their beliefs about others’
contributions, while DFR mostly refrain from contribution.
Punishment behaviour (study 1). Our hypotheses postulate that
only DCC will bear the cost of punishing defectors. In the absence
of material incentives, as is the case in the one-shot game that we
consider, DFR are expected to never invest resources to punish
others. In sharp contrast, the average investment in punishment
that is directed at defectors is higher for DFR than for DCC
(albeit not signiﬁcantly different; MDFR= 1.38, MDCC= 1.14;
Mann–Whitney z= 0.32, P= 0.749; each participant as an
independent observation for all tests in this section; Fig. 1c), and
DFR are not signiﬁcantly different from DCC in the share of
participants who use punishment when encountering a group
member who contributed less than themselves (57% vs. 44%;
χ2(1)= 0.44, P= 0.506, N= 46; Fig. 1d). Additional to the pun-
ishment of defectors shown in Fig. 1, sanctioning cooperators (i.e.
antisocial punishment30,31,47–49) was also permitted. However,
engagement in antisocial punishment is generally low and dif-
ferences between DCC and DFR are not signiﬁcant (Supple-
mentary Note 3).
We use a regression analysis to control for factors that can
potentially inﬂuence the punishment decision (Supplementary
Note 4). The results conﬁrm our ﬁndings reported above. Both
the frequency and severity of punishment are not signiﬁcantly
different between DCC and DFR. The only difference in the
punishment behaviour of DCC and DFR is an opposing peer
effect: as other group members contribute more, DCC are more
likely to punish a defector, but DFR are less likely to punish a
defector. A possible explanation is that DCC perceive others’ high
contributions as a signal for a high contribution norm, which
makes them more likely to enforce this norm50. The regression
results are robust to a stricter classiﬁcation of DCC, as well as to a
continuous measure of strong positive reciprocity.
Emotions (study 1). In line with previous studies51,52, we ﬁnd a
strong link between punishment expenditure and the intensity of
negative emotions one experiences (Supplementary Note 5). All
ﬁve negative emotions included in the questionnaire (anger,
contempt, envy, irritation and jealousy) are positively correlated
with punishment expenditure. In the following we focus on anger,
the central moral emotion connected with norm transgressions53.
Figure 2 illustrates the self-reported anger of DCC and DFR
depending on the degree to which others’ contribution deviates
from their own contribution. In both the without punishment
and with punishment treatments, DCC and DFR exhibit higher
anger levels as the negative deviation of others’ increases, and in
both treatments DCC and DFR mostly feel no anger towards
group members who contributed at least as much as they did. A
regression analysis shows no signiﬁcant level differences between
DCC and DFR in the with punishment treatment (Supplementary
Note 5). The only difference between DCC and DFR is that DFR
are signiﬁcantly angrier than DCC when a group member con-
tributed more than them. Overall, DCC and DFR are highly
similar in the way anger is related to the behaviour of others.
Summary of study 1. The aim of study 1 was to provide a direct
test of the often-invoked assumption that strong positive reci-
procity (conditional cooperation) and strong negative reciprocity
(punishment) are linked: strong reciprocators are necessarily
DCC and may punish if others contribute less than them; DFR
never punish, and cooperate only if there is a threat of punish-
ment. The main result of study 1 is that the individual tendency
to punish defectors is independent of dispositions towards strong
positive reciprocity: the punishment behaviour of DCC and DFR
is virtually indistinguishable; both punish those who contribute
less than them to a similar degree. This result is reminiscent of
‘selﬁsh punisher’ types who do not contribute to the public good,
but punish other non-contributors54,55. The difference is that in
our experiment DFR do make positive contributions to the public
good when there is a threat of punishment and then, like DCC,
also punish those who contributed less than them. In fact, DFR
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Fig. 2 Self-reported anger levels depend on the deviation from the own contribution. Participants indicated the intensity of anger on a scale from 1 (not at
all) to 7 (very much). The size of the bubbles corresponds to the number of observations at this location. The lines indicate the locally weighted regression
functions of DCC (dark blue) and DFR (orange), and are very similar for both types. In both treatments, DCC and DFR feel angrier as group member’s
negative deviations from the own contribution are higher
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are not only similar to DCC in their punishment behaviour, but
also increase their contributions to the public good when facing
the threat of punishment.
Motives to punish. Even if their punishment behaviour is highly
similar, DCC and DFR might have different motives to punish in
study 1. Given the 2:1 punishment ratio in study 1, (prosocial)
punishment harms the punished person, but also reduces the
absolute payoff differences between the punisher and the pun-
ished person. Study 2 is designed to separate these two motiva-
tions by changing the punishment ratio such that punishment no
longer reduces payoff differences, while keeping contribution
levels similar to those in study 1.
Study 2 closely follows the two-phase design of the with
punishment treatment in study 1. The ﬁrst phase was identical to
that of study 1. The second phase was different; it included two
punishment conditions that differ in the punishment ratio27,56–59
(see Methods). In one condition, the ratio was 3:1, which allowed
the punisher to reduce the absolute payoff difference vis-à-vis a
punished free rider. Crucially, in the other condition the
punishment ratio was 1:1, which did not allow the punisher to
change the absolute difference in payoffs between herself and the
punished person, thus excluding one of the motives for prosocial
punishment present in study 1.
A novel feature of study 2 is that the actual punishment ratio
applicable to each participant was determined—by an individual
random draw—only after making the contribution decisions in
the second phase. Each participant had a 50% chance of drawing
the 3:1 punishment ratio (for each MU this person spent on
punishment, the punished group member lost 3 MU), and a 50%
chance of drawing the 1:1 punishment ratio (for each MU this
person spent on punishment, the punished group member lost 1
MU). This procedure has two important advantages: (a)
contribution levels and beliefs about others’ contributions were
kept constant across the two conditions, allowing for a clean
comparison of punishing behaviour, as everything preceding the
punishment decision is identical; (b) the expected payoff
reduction of each MU spent on punishment was 2 MU, as in
study 1, allowing for a comparison between the studies. We
recruited 272 participants to take part in study 2; 135 were
randomly assigned to the 3:1 punishment ratio condition, and
137 to the 1:1 punishment ratio condition.
Dispositions towards strong positive reciprocity (study 2).
Following the ﬁrst phase, 55.5% of participants were classiﬁed as
DCC, 27.9% as DFR, and 16.5% remained unclassiﬁed (and were
excluded from the analysis). The distribution of types in study 2 is
very similar to that of study 1, χ2(2)= 4.46, P= 0.108, N= 456.
Beliefs and contribution behaviour (study 2). Contributions in
study 2 (M= 9.62, SD= 7.12), as well as beliefs about others’
contributions (M= 9.72, SD= 6.01), were similar to those in
study 1 (Mann–Whitney z=−1.31, P= 0.191; z=−0.97, P=
0.333; resp.), conﬁrming that our novel punishment procedure
indeed created similar incentives to contribute as compared to the
with punishment treatment in study 1 (Supplementary Note 6).
Punishment behaviour (study 2). Pooling the 3:1 and 1:1 pun-
ishment ratio conditions in study 2, we ﬁnd that the novel
punishment procedure had little effect on overall prosocial pun-
ishment expenditures, with both DCC and DFR spending simi-
larly in study 1 and 2 (Mann–Whitney zDCC= 1.11, PDCC=
0.267; zDFR= 0.57, PDFR= 0.572; each participant as an inde-
pendent observation for all tests in this section). See Supple-
mentary Note 7 for additional details.
We now examine each punishment condition separately
(Fig. 3). When the punishment ratio was 3:1—which allows for
the reduction of absolute payoff differences—the expenditures of
DCC and DFR on prosocial punishment are nearly identical
(MDCC= 1.19, SDDCC= 1.52; MDFR= 1.19, SDDFR= 1.60;
Mann–Whitney z=−0.38, P= 0.707; Fig. 3a) and the difference
in the proportion of prosocial punishers is not signiﬁcant (60%
DCC vs. 71% DFR; χ2(1)= 0.67, P= 0.412, N= 79; Fig. 3b).
The main point of interest in study 2 is the 1:1 punishment ratio
condition, which excludes payoff-based motives for punishment,
e.g. an aversion against or preference for inequality, because
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Fig. 3 Prosocial punishment behaviour of DCC and DFR in the 3:1 punishment ratio condition and the 1:1 punishment ratio condition. a Average expenditure
of DCC and DFR on prosocial punishment in the 3:1 punishment ratio condition (NDCC= 77; NDFR= 35); Mann–Whitney test, n.s. P > 0.10. b Share of DCC
and DFR engaging in prosocial punishment in the 3:1 punishment ratio condition; n.s. P > 0.10, χ2 test. c The average expenditure of DCC and DFR on
prosocial punishment in the 1:1 punishment ratio condition (NDCC= 74; NDFR= 41); n.s. P > 0.10, Mann–Whitney test. d Share of DCC and DFR engaging in
prosocial punishment in the 1:1 punishment ratio condition; n.s. P > 0.10, χ2 test. The error bars indicate ± 1 SEM
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punishment does not change the inequality of payoffs. If the
punishment of DFR is motivated primarily by inequality, they
should not punish, or punish less than DCC, when the punishment
ratio is 1:1. As in the 3:1 condition, DCC and DFR expenditures on
prosocial punishment are very similar (MDCC= 0.56, SDDCC=
1.34; MDFR= 0.68, SDDFR= 1.35; Mann–Whitney z=−0.65, P=
0.513; Fig. 3c) and the proportion of prosocial punishers is
indistinguishable (29% DCC vs. 39% DFR; χ2(1)= 0.84, P= 0.359,
N= 79; Fig. 3d). Additionally, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant
differences in the antisocial punishment behaviour of DCC and
DFR (Supplementary Note 8). A series of regression models
support these results and do not show evidence of differences in
the frequency or severity of punishment between DCC and DFR,
even when using a stricter classiﬁcation of DCC, controlling for
deviations from beliefs or using a continuous measure of strong
positive reciprocity (Supplementary Note 9). Despite the stark
difference in their disposition towards strong positive reciprocity,
DCC and DFR seem to be strong negative reciprocators to the
same degree, and, moreover, for a similar set of motives.
As discussed above, the 3:1 punishment ratio permits a larger
set of motives for prosocial punishment. Accordingly, and in line
with previous ﬁndings56,57,59, both DCC and DFR spent more on
prosocial punishment when the punishment ratio was 3:1 than
when it was 1:1 (Mann–Whitney z= 3.19, P= 0.001; z= 2.02, P
= 0.043; resp.). Overall, independent of the disposition towards
strong positive reciprocity, the 3:1 condition seems to tap into a
larger range of motives to punish and induces higher punishment
expenditure.
Emotions (study 2). Similar to study 1, anger and punishment
are positively correlated in both the 3:1 and 1:1 punishment ratio
conditions (Supplementary Note 10). Figure 4 shows the anger
levels reported by DCC and DFR separately for each punishment
ratio. For both types and across the two ratios, anger is associated
in a similar manner with negative deviations of other group
members’ contributions. A regression analysis does not reveal
signiﬁcant level differences in anger across types for neither the
3:1 nor the 1:1 punishment ratios (Supplementary Note 10).
Summary of study 2. Study 2 shows that independent of the
punishment ratio and the set of relevant motives for punishment
that it dictates, DCC and DFR use very similar levels of prosocial
punishment, the type of punishment that drives and enables
cooperation. Along with the replication of study 1’s ﬁnding that
the relation between anger and punishment is similar for DCC
and DFR, study 2 shows that DCC and DFR are not only very
similar in their punishment behaviour, but are also guided by
similar motives and emotional responses.
Discussion
Our experiments, which measure cooperative dispositions inde-
pendently from cooperation and punishment behaviour, provide
unambiguous evidence for both strong positive and negative
reciprocity, but do not support the hypothesis of a correlation
between the two at the individual level. We ﬁnd that the intrinsic
disposition towards strong positive reciprocity (i.e. whether one is
willing to positively reciprocate, even at a personal cost, others’
kind actions) is unrelated to the willingness to pay a cost in order
to reciprocate others’ unkind actions by using punishment. In
fact, in the presence of a punishment opportunity, DFR con-
tribute only slightly less than DCC, and are very similar to them
in their punishment levels, motives for punishment, and the way
punishment is related to anger. Thus, selﬁshness does not extend
to the realm of strong negative reciprocity; DFR do not free ride
on the punishment of others. An important implication of our
results is that the ‘burden of cooperation’ is carried by a larger set
of individuals than previously assumed, which can help explain
the high levels of cooperation observed when punishment
opportunities are available14,34,60–62.
The distinction between people based on their disposition
towards strong positive reciprocity, i.e. whether they are predis-
posed to conditionally cooperate with others or not, has proven to
be crucial in understanding the dynamics of cooperation in the
absence of punishment opportunities. In combination with
expectations regarding the future contributions of others, mea-
sured dispositions help explain cooperation, which typically
declines over time when the punishment of non-cooperators is
not possible5,33. The current results suggest that the distinction
between DCC and DFR is not crucial in explaining the main-
tenance of cooperation, which requires that there are sufﬁciently
many strong negative reciprocators in the population. Since the
punishment behaviour of DCC and DFR is virtually identical, the
ongoing cooperative success of groups depends more on the
1
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7
−20 −10 0 10 20 −20 −10 0 10 20
3:1 Punishment ratio 1:1 Punishment ratio
Disp. conditional cooperators Disp. free riders
Locally weighted regression Locally weighted regression
A
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Deviation from the own contribution
Fig. 4 Self-reported anger increases for a negative deviation of others, independent of the punishment ratio or the individual cooperative disposition. The
emotional reaction of DCC is similar to that of DFR in the 3:1 and 1:1 punishment ratio condition. The size of the bubbles corresponds to the number of
observations at this location. The lines indicate the locally weighted regression functions for DCC (dark blue) and DFR (orange)
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presence of a sufﬁcient number of strong negative reciprocators
than on its composition in terms of DCC and DFR.
A likely explanation, which our data support, is that once an
individual chooses to cooperate, be it due to a willingness to
reciprocate the cooperation of others or due to fear of being
punished for non-cooperation, the negative emotions associated
with the free-riding behaviour of other group members, and the
desire to relieve oneself from these emotions, take over strategic
considerations13. In other words, some people are willing to
exploit others, but nobody likes being exploited. This inter-
pretation is consistent with Yamagishi et al.41 who ﬁnd that
rejections of unfair offers in ultimatum games are unrelated to
prosocial cooperation in trust games and prisoner’s dilemma
games. It is also consistent with experimental34,40,42 and survey-
based evidence38,39 showing that behavioural measures consistent
with strong positive and negative reciprocity are unrelated. Our
experiments, which separate cooperative dispositions from
behaviour, show that otherwise self-regarding people are there-
fore suddenly willing to bear the cost of disciplining wrongdoers,
even in the absence of personal beneﬁts for doing so.
A careful examination of the literature on social preferences
reveals a number of frameworks that are suggestive of our results.
For example, Fehr and Schmidt’s model of social preferences23
makes a distinction between attitudes towards disadvantageous
and advantageous inequality, and models each with a separate
parameter (α and β, respectively). An agent with α > 0 and β= 0
is expected to minimise disadvantageous inequality by punishing
group members who contributed less than herself, but not to
contribute to the public good even when expecting others to do
so, because she does not mind the advantageous inequality. Such
hypocritical punishment is exhibited by the DFR in our experi-
ment who are willing to invest in punishing others. Note, how-
ever, that this reasoning holds only when punishment can indeed
reduce disadvantageous inequality, as is the case in study 1 and
when the punishment ratio was 3:1 in study 2. The willingness to
punish when the punishment ratio is 1:1 is not readily explained
by a desire to reduce inequality. Our results also question theories
of social preferences that assume a single reciprocity parameter
that governs behaviour in both the positive and negative reci-
procity domain20–22.
Another example is recent work showing that there are two
types of non-cooperators, namely Homo economicus and quasi-
Homo economicus, who differ only slightly in the degree to which
they pursue their own self-interest without regarding the welfare
of others, or, in other words, in the degree to which they are non-
reciprocal. These types, however, differ signiﬁcantly in their
psychological composition; while the former base their selﬁsh
choices on rational calculations, the latter are more impulsive63.
This result shows that the non-reciprocal side of human beha-
viour is not unidimensional, but involves both choice patterns
and psychological traits. Similarly, our data point to the conclu-
sion that the reciprocal side of human behaviour is also not
unidimensional; rather, there is a discontinuity when shifting
from positive to negative reciprocity.
Methods
Participants and procedures (study 1). We conducted the experiments between
November 2012 and February 2014. We recruited 184 students at the University of
Nottingham without prior experience in public goods experiments (101 females,
average age= 19.84, SD= 2.14), using the recruitment software ORSEE64. The
sample size was determined in expectation of heterogeneity in cooperative dis-
positions and to ensure a minimum number of participants from each type. From
previous literature4,65, we expect about 25% of DFR. We therefore recruited at least
90 participants in each treatment to ensure a minimum expected number of 20
DFR. Participants were allocated to treatments at the session level; we conducted
three sessions of the without punishment and six sessions of the with punishment
treatment. The experiment was approved by the University of Nottingham School
of Economics Ethics Committee and informed consent was obtained from all
participants. The majority of participants were undergraduates from various ﬁelds
of study (28% Humanities, 26% Economics and Business studies, 22% Natural
Sciences and Engineering, 17% Law, Social and Political Sciences and 7% Medical
Science). The experiment was computerised with z-Tree66. The experimental ses-
sions lasted for about 90 minutes and participants’ earnings were paid in private at
the end of each session (M= £10.25, SD= £2.00). Each session consisted of
reading the instructions, computerised control questions, two experimental games
and a questionnaire. The control questions were designed to check participants’
understanding of the games’ payoff functions. Participants had to correctly answer
all control questions before the start of the experimental games. We did not provide
any feedback after the ﬁrst game in order to prevent participants from updating
their beliefs as well as to exclude potential income effects and strategic play. See the
Supplementary Note 11 for the instructions.
The public goods game (study 1). The core of our experimental design is a one-
shot public goods game, played in groups of four. Each group member received an
endowment of 20 tokens each, and decided how many tokens to keep for herself
and how many to contribute to a common group project. Each token that a person
kept for herself yielded one money unit (MU) to that person. Contributions to the
project were multiplied by 1.6 and divided equally among the four group members.
The social optimum is characterised by full contributions, whereas the individually
money-maximising strategy is to contribute nothing, regardless of the choices of
other group members.
The experiment included two phases, each with a different variation of the one-
shot public goods game. The ﬁrst phase was used to assess each participant’s
individual disposition towards cooperation. In the second phase, groups were
randomly re-matched and participants played a standard one-shot public goods
game, either with or without punishment (in different treatments).
First phase—measuring individual cooperative dispositions (study 1). Indivi-
dual dispositions towards cooperation were measured using the one-shot public
goods game described above, played in a variant of the strategy method4. Each
participant ﬁrst decided on an unconditional contribution to the public good, and
then on a series of conditional contributions, indicating her preferred contribution
for each average (integer) contribution of the other group members. We refer to the
resulting set of choices as the contribution schedule. For one randomly selected
member of each group, the contribution schedule determined the actual con-
tribution to the public good, ensuring that both decisions (unconditional and
conditional contribution) are potentially payoff relevant. We also elicited partici-
pants’ beliefs about their group members’ average contribution: participants earned
three MU for guessing the average contribution of others correctly, two MU for a
deviation of one point, one MU for a deviation of two points, and zero MU for a
higher deviation.
The contribution schedules were used to classify participants according to their
disposition towards cooperation. The criteria were based on past work using this
method65: DCC increase their contributions in the average contributions of others;
they either have a positive Spearman’s rank correlation coefﬁcient, signiﬁcant at the
1% level, between their own contribution and the others’ average contribution, or
display a monotonically increasing schedule, with at least one increase. DFR
contribute exactly zero for each and every possible average contribution of others.
Participants who were not classiﬁed as either DCC or DFR were excluded from the
analysis, as our main hypothesis does not make unambiguous behavioural
predictions for them.
Second phase—cooperation and punishment behaviour (study 1). In this
phase, participants played the one-shot public goods game in direct-response mode
either without or with punishment. In both treatments, each participant ﬁrst
decided, unconditional on the choices of others, how many tokens (out of 20) to
contribute to the public good. In the without punishment treatment, beliefs about
the group members’ average contribution were elicited and incentivised as in the
ﬁrst phase. Participants then learned the individual contribution of each of their
group members in order to keep the information structure constant across the two
treatments. Participants then proceeded to the emotion elicitation questionnaire
described below. In the with punishment treatment, the belief elicitation was not
incentivised to avoid punishment due to disappointment caused by lost income
from inaccurate beliefs. After learning the individual contribution of each of their
group members, participants had the option to assign up to ﬁve punishment points
to each of their group members. Every punishment point cost the punisher one
MU and destroyed two MU of the punished group member’s income. To avoid
negative payoffs, each participant received a ﬁxed payment of 10 MU. Then,
participants stated their belief about how many punishment points they received
from each of their group members and reported emotions as described below.
Emotions were elicited before receiving feedback on the outcome of the punish-
ment stage.
Emotions elicitation (study 1). Participants reported their emotional response to
each group member’s individual contribution level. The questionnaire, adapted
from Bosman and van Winden51, included thirteen emotions (anger, contempt,
envy, fear, guilt, happiness, irritation, jealousy, joy, sadness, shame, surprise and
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warmth). Participants rated the intensity with which they felt each emotion on a
seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
Participants and procedures (study 2). We conducted the experiments of study 2
between May and June 2016. The experimental procedures in study 2 were iden-
tical to those of study 1. Overall, 272 participants took part in study 2 (169 females,
average age= 21.14, SD= 2.43). Like in study 1, we chose the sample size to
account for heterogeneity of cooperative dispositions. However, we chose a sig-
niﬁcantly larger sample with 135 participants in the 3:1 and 137 participants in the
1:1 punishment ratio condition to increase the power to detect differences in
punishment behaviour across dispositions. We conducted ten sessions in total and
within each session participants were randomly allocated to either the 3:1 or the 1:1
punishment ratio condition. The majority of participants were undergraduates
from various ﬁelds of study (12% Humanities, 13% Economics and Business stu-
dies, 29% Natural Sciences and Engineering, 15% Law, Social and Political Sciences
and 31% Medical Science). Participants’ earnings were paid in private at the end of
each session (M= £10.85, SD= £1.98).
Random draw of the punishment ratio (study 2). The ﬁrst phase of study 2 was
identical to that of study 1. The second phase closely follows the with punishment
treatment in study 1. The difference was that in study 2 the punishment ratio was
determined randomly. At the start of the game, participants were informed that
each participant’s individual punishment ratio will be either 3:1 or 1:1, with a 50%
chance for each option. A 3:1 (1:1) punishment ratio means that each punishment
point cost a punishing participant one MU and destroyed three (one) MU of the
punished group member’s income. The random draw was independent for each
participant, such that individuals within each group could have different punish-
ment ratios. This novel design allows for observing the effect of different pun-
ishment ratios on punishment while holding the contribution level constant.
Statistical analysis. Our main results are based on standard non-parametric tests
(Mann–Whitney tests, and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests) suitable to the nature of
our experimental data. All tests are two-sided. Supplementary regression analyses
are discussed in the Supplementary Information.
Code availability. We used STATA/SE 15 for data analysis. The codes67 are
available from the Dryad Digital Repository: https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.
dc42s75.
Data availability. The data for the statistical analyses67 are available from the
Dryad Digital Repository: https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.dc42s75.
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